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MICROFINANCE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE: 
A GLOBAL EMPIRICAL STUDY. 
MARR, Ana* 
 AWAWORYI, Sefa 
Abstract 
Over the years, microfinance has been purported to have experienced enormous progress 
and is seen to contribute towards poverty reduction by extending finance to people 
previously excluded from formal financial markets. However, the question on how 
microfinance social performance is assessed remains unresolved. The paper develops an 
original social performance rating for 878 microfinance institutions (MFIs), across all 
geographic regions in the world for a period of 11 years (2000-2010). Furthermore, the 
paper investigates whether or not the age, assets, regulation status, loans per loan officers, 
as well as the profit status of MFIs affect MFIs’ ability to perform socially.  
Keywords: Microfinance, social performance, measurement index 
JEL Codes: G21, F34, I32, C01      
 
1. Introduction 
Generally, microfinance has come to serve as an important tool in combating poverty and 
helping international development through the provision of specially designed financial 
products and services, and the provision of the necessary technical support to targeted 
recipients to start and/or grow businesses to sustain themselves. The targeted recipients 
mainly are individuals from low-income households; who have been labelled by the 
major formal institutions as ‘credit unworthy’ to have access to a specific type of credit or 
services. Microfinance, by and large, has the sole intention of helping the poor or the low-
income households in certain areas (usually rural) by giving them the necessary support 
and loans to establish small productive ventures.  
These tailored financial products and services are provided by microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). Today, the number of MFIs across the globe is on the increase and regardless of 
the size, age, or such differences between MFIs, there is a level of, or at least an expected 
level of, social performance attained by the microfinance programmes initiated by each 
one of these MFIs. Notwithstanding, the major question is: how is the social performance 
of microfinance assessed? The importance of social performance assessment cannot be 
underestimated considering the significant implications on beneficiaries’ welfare. 
Primarily, well-executed assessments for microfinance are able to help identify the policy 
remedies for the microfinance industry and also to expose whether or not MFIs are really 
doing what they are professed to be doing.  
Taking into consideration the growing nature of the microfinance industry, a large 
number of empirical studies have emerged that explore the various aspects of the 
industry. However, most of these studies focus on aspects other than social performance; 
the few that have explored social performance as a research topic, resort mainly to 
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qualitative approaches and focus on the particular issue of social impact.1 
Notwithstanding, some notable research such as Karlan and Zinman (2011), Aroca 
(2002), Ghalib (2007) and Khandker (1998) have used quantitative methodologies to 
assess the impact of microfinance interventions. 
Similarly, in helping understand how social performance can be assessed, this paper seeks 
to contribute to existing studies that try to explain social performance by applying 
quantitative methodologies to create social performance ratings for MFIs and by 
explaining the relationship between some specific variables and social performance. In 
the pursuit of this, the first part of this paper brings to light the perspectives of existing 
studies which were concerned with the entire concept of social performance or aspects of 
it, such as social impact, after which the data used in this study is presented. The next 
section puts across significant use of quantitative skills to collectively transform certain 
indicators into a social performance index (hereafter SPI) which is used as social 
performance ratings. In this section, it is argued that certain indicators are viable enough 
to aid in the assessment of microfinance social performance. Thus, putting together these 
indicators in a coherent and logical manner should give an unbiased numerical rating or 
assessment of microfinance social performance. The last section of this paper, presents a 
series of empirical results which explain social performance and the level of significance 
and contribution of variables like MFI age, assets, regulation status, loans per loan 
officers, and MFI profit status on the social performance of MFIs. The nature of these 
effects on social performance, based on geographical locations as well as on country 
income levels, is also studied.  
2. The perspective of existing studies  
Microfinance, as claimed by proponents, is aimed at poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the 
impacts made by microfinance cuts across diverse facets. This has led to the subjection of 
MFIs under a series of impact assessments as evidenced in mainstream literature.  
In his paper which reviewed microfinance impact assessment methodologies, Hulme 
(2000) indicated that microfinance impact assessment could be done with three possible 
approaches, i.e. the humanities tradition method; the scientific approach; and the 
participatory learning and action (PLA).  Hulme (2000) explains that the scientific 
approach conventionally has some quantitative qualities; however, owing to the 
challenges of data availability, technicality and cost implications, this method of analysis 
is not often used. Contrary to the reasons why the scientific approach is not used, Karlan 
and Zinman (2011) and Meade (2010) postulate that microfinance impact is complex and 
therefore the precise quantitative methods have to be at least as complex as what is been 
measured. In this regard, the authors  propose that the use of rigorous processes in 
assesing microfinance impact should not be abandoned because of the technicalities and 
complexities involved. Hulme (2000) continued in his paper and asserted that the 
humanities tradition was more of a qualitative approach to assessing impact while the 
PLA seemed to be a blend of both quantitative and qualitative. In any case, the qualitative 
component of this approach is still dominant. Ghalib (2007), in turn, analyses social 
impact assesments and the underlying principles of the assesment process. The author 
identifies key indicators that primarily influence social impact and thus is able to develop 
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a generic model of microfinance impact. One crucial aspect of the model is the 
development of a measurement index, which is used for assessing social impact. In this 
paper, variables identified as social impact indicators are evaluated to a perceptible 
degree and the possible ways of assesing these variables are explored alongside.  
Notwithstanding the above, Karlan and Zinman (2008, 2011) assess impacts by use of 
randomised control trials and Barnes (1996) examines the effects of  assets acquisition of 
MFI clients. The latter proposes that a viable way of measuring microfinance social 
impact is to identify and measure assets of clients over time.  Thus in this paper, much 
focus was given to the characteristics of assets, how to measure them and whether or not 
assets could be important in determining MFI impact. Barnes (1996), meanwhile, reveals 
a positive relationship between asset accumulation and MFI impact. This approach used 
by Barnes could be a good measure of impact however, surveys in that direction cannot 
be sure whether or not other factors outside microfinance influence affected MFI clients’ 
assets accumulation. Randomised control trials developed by Karlan and his team, 
progressed with the use of a more precise methodology for assessing impacts but relies on 
intensive commitment from MFIs to allow intervention and data collection, which could 
be costly and difficult to replicate easily in other contexts and environments.    
Many more authors have put across a diverse range of findings and assertions however, 
most of these center around observing beneficiaries of microfinance programs over a 
period of time and finding one or more indicators which could serve as a measure of 
impact. This approach has generally been deemed by the microfinance industry as too 
demanding and costly for MFI practitioners to engage with and therefore more 
practitioner-centred approaches have emerged in recent years. Copestake (2007) presents 
a model in which rather than ‘proving’ impacts the aim is to ‘improve’ impacts arising 
from microfinance and thus the idea is to identify indicators and steps by which MFI 
managers themselves can assess impacts and improve upon them.  
This more recent approach tries to differentiate the terms ‘social impact’ and ‘social 
performance’ explaining that the former relates to assessing the impact on beneficiaries 
(and therefore is more related to the studies mentioned before) while social performance 
refers to “the effective translation of a [microfinance] institution’s social mission into 
practice” (Lapenu and Reboul 2006:2), and therefore it is more practitioner-centred. To 
make progress on the latter, the proponents of this concept have helped develop social 
performance indicators and ratings based on a consultation process involving primarily 
MFI managers and practitioners. Recent results of social performance measurement 
(Bédécarrats et al 2010) show that non-for-profit MFIs score generally better than for-
profit ones, while bigger MFIs are generally less oriented towards the poor. Although 
there is an effort to audit these results by external professionals, existing social 
performance indicators and ratings still remain primarily dependent on the subjective 
responses and perspectives of MFIs. 
Against this background, our paper aims at measuring social rating based on quantitative 
indicators that have been audited by third parties and reported in publicly-available 
sources, which, in turn, warrants robust and credible data. We also attempt to bridge 
between the concept of social impact and social performance by employing indicators 
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closely related to assessing social impact and then by identifying the explanatory factors 
that determine social performance. Therefore, in some cases, these two concepts are used 
inter-changeably.           
3. DATA, VARIABLES & METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data 
Data used for the analysis presented in this paper was collected from MixMarket.2 Data 
was initially retrieved for MFIs from the year 1996 to 2010. However, this was screened 
down to 11 years (2000 – 2010) owing to the unavailability of data for relevant indicators 
needed for the analysis in the rejected years. A total of 878 MFIs were sampled out. 
These MFIs cut across a total of 98 countries and are representative of all 6 geographic 
regions as presented in the MIXMarket.  
3.2. Variables/Indicators 
In generating the given social performance ratings for MFIs under study, 8 different 
indicators were used. These indicators are the MFI’s outreach, average outstanding 
balance / GNI per capita (hereafter ABPGNI), cost per borrower (hereafter CB), number 
of offices, operational self sufficiency (hereafter OSS), percent of women borrowers, 
portfolio at risk after 90 days (hereafter PAR90) and write-off ratio.   
Outreach 
Microfinance outreach has to do with the extent to which MFIs are able to cover a wider 
area or to reach and serve a greater number of people. The outreach of the MFI is used as 
an indicator for social performance because it is expected that the wider the outreach of 
an MFI, the bigger the social performance it can make. However, it is imperative to know 
that outreach cannot be the only measure of social impact since reaching a huge number 
of people does not necessarily mean these people are transformed, hence, the need for 
other indicators. MixMarket presented a qualitative measure for MFI outreach thus it was 
necessary to quantify such measures since the focus of this paper is quantitative; thus 
dummy variables were introduced.  
Average outstanding balance / GNI per capita 
Average outstanding balance/GNI per capita indicates to a reasonable extent the loan 
sizes MFIs give to borrowers. A low ratio shows that the MFI gave small loans. On the 
other hand, a high ratio means the MFI gave out loans that were too big. A low ratio for 
average outstanding balance / GNI per capita is expected to be better-off than a high ratio 
hence in measuring social performance. The biggest value of rating (100) is assigned to 
the lowest ratio whereas the smallest value (25) of rating is assigned to the highest ratio. 
This is done by a normalization3 process.  
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 MixMarket is a major microfinance database and reference for most analysts. Data from the 
MixMarket is self reported by MFIs to the information exchange. Those with external audited 
reports are included here. 
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and would not exceed the assigned scale. Mathematicians adopt a variety of formulas to help 
normalize or re-scale data depending on what is expected. (See Kruskal (1964) for details). 




Cost per borrower 
The cost per borrower given by an MFI is primarily gotten when the adjusted operating 
expense of the MFI is divided by the MFI’s adjusted average number of active borrowers. 
This indicator is seen by many as one which exposes an MFI’s efficiency. Considering 
this output, it is evident that a higher ratio for cost per loan for an MFI indicates that the 
loan given by that MFI is relatively expensive and hence clients technically may be under 
exploitation. Thus, a high ratio reflects inefficiency on the part of the MFI as well as the 
MFIs inability to perform socially since loans given out are expensive. Taking into 
account this understanding, this paper assigns a ratings mark of 100 to the MFI with the 
lowest cost per borrower ratio and a mark of 25 to the MFI with the highest cost per loan 
ratio.  
Number of offices 
This paper regards number of offices as an indicator for outreach. The underlying reason 
is based on the fact that the more the offices an MFI has, the more clients feel they can 
easily access services provided by the MFI.  
Operational self sufficiency (OSS) 
The operational self sufficiency ratio shows the ability of an MFI to cover its costs of 
operation using internally generated income. This ratio primarily is expected to be an 
efficiency ratio thus helping expose the efficiency of an MFI, however, its involvement in 
this paper as one of the indicators to measure performance is based on the argument that 
the efficiency of the MFI is relevant in performing socially as this could lead to less 
costly services to clients. 
Percent of women borrowers 
Percent of women borrowers is a relative ratio of active women borrowers to the total 
number of borrowers. Conceptually, this ratio is seen to be a very significant indicator of 
outreach considering the vulnerable nature of women in most communities and the fact 
that they are usually undermined especially in rural areas. This awareness creates the 
understanding that in a community where more women have been reached, that 
community has been positively impacted socially since it is expected that women there 
would now be in some form of meaningful business. Thus an increasing trend of percent 
of women borrowers can be seen as a positive indicator for social performance.  
Portfolio at risk after 90 days 
As the name suggests, this indicator gives a hint of the portion of an MFI’s portfolio that 
may be at risk because payment is overdue. A decreasing trend for this indicator is a 
positive indication. Furthermore, a decreasing trend for this indicator may mean that 
MFIs have been able to have a positive effect on clients and hence repayment of loans is 
prompt. Thus it could be a good indicator of social performance.  
Write-off ratio 
Lastly, the write-off ratio is a relevant indicator that can help understand the level of 
support MFIs give to clients so they don’t default. In this regard, it is sufficient to say that 
a low ratio indicates that MFIs have been supportive enough hence clients did not default. 
This can be a good measure of performance.  
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3.3.  Methodology 
3.3.1. Social Performance Ratings Methodology 
Each indicator that has been explained above as an indicator of social performance is 
rescaled and summed up into a social performance index. This index can be represented 
mathematically as; 
                                (1) 
where A to H are the normalized or rescaled values of the indicators explained above.  
Primarily, two types of rescaling formulas were used to transform the values of the 
indicators before summing them up to truly reflect what the values mean. For instance, 
for some indicators chosen as part of the measure of social performance, a small ratio 
means that MFIs are doing well while a high ratio indicates otherwise. In this case, 
formula A shown below is used in the rescale process. While in the reverse situation were 
a high ratio means good performance formula B shown below is used.  
                             (A) 
:KHUH$LVWKHGHULYHGUHVFDOHGYDOXHĮDQGȕDUHWKHKLJKHVWDQGORZHVWJLYHQUHVcaled 
value respectively that an MFI can get,  LV WKH KLJKHVW UHFRUGHG UDZ YDOXH RI WKH
indicator in use and b is the specific value of the indicator for a given MFI.  
                     (B) 
:KHUH % LV GHULYHG UHVFDOHG YDOXH Į DQG ȕ DUH WKe highest and lowest given rescaled 
value respectively that an MFI can get, DQGDUHWKHKLJKHVWDQGORZHVWUHFRUGHGUDZ
values respectively of the indicator in use and b is the specific value of the indicator for a 
given MFI.  
3.3.2. Regression Methodology  
The concept of panel data is used to analyse the relationship between social performance 
and the chosen explanatory variables. Fundamentally, a panel regression model is given 
as; 
                                                                                     (2) 
Where   N is the number of MFIs and . where T is the number of 
years under study.  
More specifically, the random effect panel models would be used based on the results 
gotten from the Hausman Tests and the Lagrange Multiplier Tests. Mainly, six (6) models 
were estimated for each group of MFIs that are analysed. The dependent variable of the 
first model was the generated social performance index (SPI) while the other five models 
had the original values of MFI outreach, CB, ABPGNI, OSS and PAR90 as their 
dependent variables. These five dependent variables happen to be part of the individual 
components which were summed up to form the SPI. This is to study the relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the individual components that make up the SPI. A 




correlation matrix of all the variables in use show a correlation coefficient of less than 0.5 
which could be an indicator that problems regarding multicollinearity are not eminent.   
We analyse this relationship by using the following regression model:  
socperfit ȕ0ȕ1ageitȕ2proitȕ3regit ȕ4loanitȕ5lnassetsit + eit              (3) 
where socperf represents all the dependent variable in this case the SPI, outreach, CB, 
ABPGNI, OSS and PAR90. age, pro, reg, loan and assets represent MFI age, profit 
status, regulatory status, loans per loan officer and assets respectively. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1.  Overall Findings    
Results for the entire sample regardless of geographic area are presented here. These have 
been presented in table 1 below.  
Table 1: Tables of Results for all MFIs collectively regardless of Geographic Regions.  
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0030** 0.0017*** 0.0002** 0.0029*** -0.0001 -0.0077*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.00006) (0.0010) 
profit status -0.0121 -0.0128 -0.0015 -0.0147 -0.00002 0.0099 
 
(0.0448) (0.0124) (0.0014) (0.0132) (0.0012) (0.0177) 
regulatory status -0.2768*** -0.0354*** 0.0003 -0.1301*** 0.0001 0.0272 
 
(0.0432) (0.0119) (0.0014) (0.0127) (0.0012) (0.0170) 
loans/loan officer 0.0129*** 0.0047*** 0.0004*** 0.0039*** 0.0001 0.0013 
 
(0.0021) (0.0006) (0.00009) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0012) 
lnassets 5.8765*** 7.4868*** -0.3454*** 0.0758 0.0968*** 0.0537 
 
(0.6048) (0.1794) (0.0251) (0.1941) (0.0210) (0.3228) 
constant 396.55*** -47.836*** 104.52*** 85.77*** 29.74*** 71.02*** 
 
(10.55) (3.0813) (0.4175) (3.3239) (0.3490) (5.3319) 
N 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 4098 
R squared 0.0891 0.5038 0.0282 0.1091 0.0161 0.0333 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
As shown in Table 1 the generated Social Performance Index (SPI) was regressed on the 
independent variables, after which five of the individual components which contributed to 
the social performance index (SPI) were used individually as dependents variables. For 
model 1 where the SPI was used as the dependent variable, it was found that all 
coefficients were statistically significant except for the coefficient of profit status. The 
coefficients of age and regulatory status were negative and significant indicating that as 
MFIs grow older and are regulated their tendency of performing socially diminishes. This 
possibly is the case since studies (like that of Bédécarrats et al., 2010) have shown that as 
MFIs grow bigger and older, they tend to drift away from their social mission. 
Furthermore, considering the various debates that have emerged whether or not it is good 
for MFIs to be regulated, it is apparent that the results of this paper point to a negative 
social performance for MFIs that are regulated. This could possibly be because of the 
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obligations and cost of operations that come along with regulations. On the other hand, 
the coefficients of loans per loan officers and assets are positive and significant indicating 
that as an MFI possesses more assets, the more it is able to perform socially. Furthermore, 
as the number of loans per loan officer increases, MFIs tend to reach many more clients 
thus social performance is attained since the level of outreach reflects the social 
performance of an MFI. The trend of results for models 2, 3 and 4 are almost the same. 
The dependent variable for model 2 is outreach while for Model 3 and 4 CB and 
ABPGNI are the dependent variables respectively. For model 2, all coefficients are 
statistically significant except for profit status while for model 3 all are significant except 
the coefficients of profit and regulatory status. Model 4 however has all coefficients 
significant except for profit status and assets. For models 2, 3 and 4 the coefficient of age 
is positive indicating that as MFIs grow older, the tendencies of expanding outreach 
increases. On the other hand, the cost per borrower becomes more expensive which from 
one perspective, could explain why the older MFIs tend to make less social performance. 
In addition, the positive coefficient of age for model 4 indicates that as MFIs grow older, 
they tend to give bigger and unaffordable loans thus higher ABPGNI is achieved which 
reflects poor social performance. The coefficient of regulatory status in model 2 and 3 are 
negative showing that regulated MFIs have lower scales of outreach and they also tend to 
reflect low ratios in terms of ABPGNI which is a good sign of social performance. 
However the coefficients of loans per loan officer in models 2, 3 and 4 are positive which 
makes economic sense for models 2 and 4. The dependent variables of model 2 and 4 are 
outreach and ABPGNI respectively. In this regard, a higher ratio of loans per loan officer 
reflects higher outreach which is true for model 2. However, for model 4 this is also true 
considering the fact that as many clients are reached, the tendency of loan repayment 
defaults also increase which is reflected in the ABPGNI. The coefficients of assets for 
model 2 and 3 are positive and negative respectively which shows clearly that the more 
assets an MFI is able to acquire, the more they are able to expand their outreach. On the 
contrary, while the assets base of the MFI is being increased, the cost per borrower tends 
to increase since by default, assets acquired add up to the MFI's operation cost thus 
clients would have to pay more on loans received. For model 5, all coefficients are 
statistically insignificant except for the intercept and the coefficient of assets which is 
positive showing that an MFI that has lots of assets increases its operational self-
sufficiency. Model 6 also shows a similar trend like model 5 where all coefficients are 
statistically insignificant except for two (2), the intercept and the coefficient of age which 
reflected negative results. This coefficient signifies that as MFIs grow older, they tend to 
have lower percentages of their portfolios at risk.  
4.2. Findings by Geographical Regions 
This section presents findings that have been made based on geographical regions.  
4.2.1. The Case of Africa 
Table 2 below gives the regression results for MFIs in Africa only. Considering MFIs in 
Africa only, results show that for the overall SPI, all coefficients are statistically 
significant except for coefficients of age and profit status. The trends and relationships 
between the other independent variables which are statistically significant and social 
performance in Africa is similar to observed trends when taking into account MFIs in all 
geographical regions collectively. This is the same for model 2 as well except that for 




model 2, the coefficients of age, profit and regulatory status are not statistically 
significant. The results for model 3 for all MFIs and MFIs in Africa only, similarly have 
related results except that in Africa, the coefficient of assets is statistically significant 
which indicates that as MFI assets increase in Africa, the cost per borrower decreases. 
 
Table 2: Table of Results for MFIs in Africa 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
Age 0.0004 0.0008 -0.00004 0.0029** 0.0002 -0.0042 
 
(0.0044) (0.0013) (0.00006) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0027) 
profit status -0.0334 -0.0016 0.0014 0.0289 -0.0046** -0.0271 
 
(0.1001) (0.0246) (0.0009) (0.0326) (0.0021) (0.0422) 
regulatory status -0.2509** -0.0471 0.0008 -0.1109*** -0.0002 -0.0351 
 
(0.1172) (0.0287) (0.0010) (0.0382) (0.0024) (0.0493) 
loans/loan officer 0.0369*** 0.0166*** 0.0005*** 0.0134*** 0.0005** 0.0005 
 
(0.0067) (0.0020) (0.00009) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0040) 
lnassets 4.7181*** 8.1404*** -0.1042*** -1.9404*** 0.2395*** 0.6703 
 
(1.7724) (0.4973) (0.0194) (0.6079) (0.0507) (0.9301) 
constant 389.67*** -58.81*** 100.78*** 105.71*** 27.12*** 60.51*** 
 
(29.69) (8.1243) (0.3116) (10.080) (0.8028) (14.983) 
N 583 583 583 583 583 583 
R squared 0.0543 0.5548 0.2047 0.1856 0.1538 0.0094 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
Also for model 4 the coefficient of assets is significant for Africa and the sign has 
changed to negative. Model 5 however presents very distinct differences. The coefficients 
for profit status and loans per loan officer are statistically significant in this case. Profit 
status has a negative coefficient which shows that profit making MFIs are more self-
sufficient than non-profit making MFIs which makes economic sense considering the fact 
that profits that are made can be used to help support the operations of the MFI, an 
advantage which non-profit MFIs do not have. Considering the positive coefficient of 
assets in model 5, it can be said that in Africa, MFIs with more assets are more self-
sufficient operationally compared to MFIs with relatively less assets. The coefficients of 
model 6 all seem to be statistically insignificant except for the intercept which is positive 
and significant.  
4.2.2. The Case of East Asia & the Pacific 
Table 3 below shows the results for MFIs in East Asia and the Pacific. Considering MFIs 
in East Asia and the Pacific, the effects of the independent variables on the SPI as shown 
in Model 1 of table 3 are similar to that of Africa in terms of statistical significance and 
the signs of the coefficients. This means that effects of the explanatory variables on social 
performance in Africa and East Asia and the Pacific are almost similar. However when 
model 2 is considered, it is observed that similar effects are eminent except for the 
coefficient of loans per loans officer which is now statistically insignificant and that of 
regulatory status which is now negative and significant. This is in line with the 
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observations in the results gotten when the sample size included all geographical 
locations collectively as shown in table 1. 
Table 3: Table of Results for MFIs in East Asia and The Pacific 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0030 -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0008** 0.0004** -0.0036 
 
(0.0070) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0037) 
profit status 0.1692 -0.0008 -0.0074 -0.0739 0.0151*** 0.3019*** 
 
(0 .2024) (0.0532) (0.0062) (0.0458) (0.0052) (0.0845) 
regulatory status - 0.3512** - 0.0891** 0.0002 -0.1810*** 0.0171*** 0.2031** 
 
(0.2030) (0.0534) (0.0062) (0.0459) (0.0052) (0.0843) 
loans/loan officer 0.0104** 0.0015 0.0009** 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0048 
 
(0.0060) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0033) 
lnassets 5.9184*** 6.7675*** -0.6456*** -0.1401 0.1370*** 2.0297** 
 
(1.6924) (0.4176) (0.0926) (0.3609) (0.0451) (0.8909) 
constant 397.54*** -29.72*** 109.17*** 104.32*** 27.18*** 9.9490 
 
(34.75) (8.8245) (1.6130) (7.6100) (0.9110) (16.7610) 
N 541 541 541 541 541 541 
R squared 0.1429 0.5043 0.0775 0.1819 0.1354   0.0094 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
Model 3 also reveals similar effects as in the case of Africa. The results for model 4 show 
quite a different trend as compared to results for all MFIs collectively and MFIs in Africa 
only. This result shows that the coefficient of ABPGNI is significant but negative which 
differs from what was observed for Africa and all MFIs regardless of geographical area. 
All other coefficients are statistically insignificant except for the intercept. Again, 
observed results for model 5 differ from results for Africa and all MFIs collectively. Here 
all coefficients are statistically significant except the coefficient of loans per loan officer. 
The coefficient of profit status is positive here as compared to a negative coefficient for 
Africa and all MFIs collectively. Furthermore, the coefficient of regulatory status is also 
positive and significant meaning MFIs in East Asia and the Pacific that are regulated are 
more self-sufficient that non-regulated ones. Results for Model 6 also show that only 
coefficients of profit status, regulatory status and assets are significant with positive 
signs. 
4.2.3. The Case of Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
Table 4 below shows the findings in the case of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The 
relationship between social performance and the explanatory variables under study in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia seems quite different from what has been observed 
tables 1, 2 and 3. For model 1, only the coefficients of age, loans per loan officer and the 
intercept are statistically significant however the trends of these coefficients are 
consistent with what was observed in the case where all MFIs were considered 
collectively (table 1). For model 2, the coefficients of age and loans per loan officer 
depict similar relationships as in the case of all MFIs collectively (table 1) however, the 
coefficient of profit status is statistically significant and show a negative relationship. In 
model 3, the coefficients of loans per loan officer and assets show a similar trend as 




observed in the cases of MFIs represented in model 3 of tables 1, 2 and 3. However, the 
sign of the coefficient of age in this model changes thus a negative relationship between 
MFI age and cost per borrower in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Results for model 3 
are all consistent with what was found for Africa except that the coefficient of profit 
status is statistically significant in this case 
Table 4: Table of results for MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0061** 0.0010 -0.0003** 0.0035** -0.0004*** -0.0076*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0020) 
profit status 0.1033 -0.0361** -0.0014 0.0774*** 0.0012 0.0167 
 
(0.0630) (0.0173) (0.0058) (0.0274) (0.0026) (0.0277) 
regulatory status -0.0104 -0.0114 0.0042 -0.0857** -0.0064* 0.1252*** 
 
(0.0804) (0.0222) (0.0074) (0.0351) (0.0034) (0.0361) 
loans/loan officer 0.0963*** 0.0271*** 0.0020*** 0.0299*** 0.0012** 0.0318** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0036) (0.0005) (0.0059) (0.0006) (0.0075) 
Inassets -0.5463 6.3922*** -0.1973*** -1.2660** -0.0562 -1.3831** 
 
(1.1970) (0.3501) (0.0579) (0.5685) (0.0548) (0.6605) 
constant 441.12*** -43.21*** 100.89*** 88.61*** 33.07*** 86.52*** 
 
(19.606) (5.6805) (1.1467) (9.1920) (0.8854) (10.5344) 
N 732 732 732 732 732 732 
R squared 0.1994 0.6048 0.0858 0.1922 0.0421 0.0838 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
. The nature of the relationships between the explanatory variables and ABPGNI however 
remain the same for both geographical regions. Considering model 5, there are apparent 
differences when comparing with observations made in the case of East Asia and the 
Pacific. All coefficients that happen to be statistically significant in both cases seem to 
have different signs thus whatever observations have been made in the case of East Asia 
and the Pacific regarding OSS and the explanatory variables, the opposite relationship is 
observed amongst MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This opposite relationship is 
also observed with the relationship between assets and OSS when considering MFIs in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia and all MFIs regardless of geographic area (table 1). In 
the case of model 6, it was found that taking into account the relationship between 
PAR90 and the explanatory variables, age and assets, opposite relationships exists when 
contrasting Eastern Europe and Central Asia with East Asia and the Pacific 
4.2.4. The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean 
The results for the relationship between social performance and the explanatory variables 
in Latin America and the Caribbean as shown in table 5 below are consistent with 
relationships found for Africa (table 2), East Asia and the pacific (table 3) as well as all 
MFIs regardless of geographic region (table 1) however, the coefficient of profit status is 
statistically significant in Latin America and The Caribbean whereas it is not in the other 
regions. Furthermore, in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean the coefficient of 
age is statistically insignificant. Considering model 2, the signs of all the statistically 
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significant coefficients are consistent with what is observed for the coefficients in the 
case of all other geographic regions thus in terms of outreach, the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and outreach in all geographical locations seems to be similar. 
In like manner, for model 3, similar observations have been made for MFIs in Latin 
America and The Caribbean as well as Africa except that in Africa the coefficient of 
regulatory status is statistically insignificant. Model 4, show all coefficients statistically 
significant with the signs of the coefficients consistent with what was found for MFIs 
collectively regardless of their geographic regions. Model 5 on the other hand shows only 
the coefficient of the intercept term and loans per loan officer to be positive and 
statistically significant. This positive nature of the loans per loan officer coefficient in 
model 5 fall in line with what has been observed in the case of Africa, Middle East and 
North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In model 6, all coefficients are 
statistically significant in exception of the coefficient for assets.  The signs of the 
observed coefficients, primarily match what was found in the case of Africa however, the 
coefficients were statistically insignificant in the case of Africa. Furthermore, the nature 
of the relationship observed between MFI age and portfolio at risk is similar to what was 
observed for all MFIs collectively as well as MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Table 5: Table of results for MFIs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0003 0.0021** -0.0001** 0.0029*** 0.00003 -0.0066*** 
 
(0.0030) (0.0009) (0.00004) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0018) 
profit status -0.2110*** -0.0485*** 0.0017 -0.0519*** 0.0011 -0.0671** 
 
(0.0657) (0.0183) (0.0011) (0.0198) (0.0020) (0.0271) 
regulatory status -0.3315*** -0.0008 0.0021* -0.1376*** 0.0031 -0.0538* 
 
(0.0688) (0.0193) (0.0011) (0.0208) (0.0021) (0.0292) 
loans/loan officer 0.0195*** 0.0074*** 0.0004*** 0.0092*** 0.0004** 0.0065** 
 
(0.0056) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0034) 
lnassets 6.7935*** 7.9190*** -0.1495*** 0.6011* -0.0039 0.0339 
 
(1.0571) (0.3178) (0.0146) (0.3385) (0.0360) (0.5662) 
constant 384.68*** -58.66*** 101.33*** 79.73*** 30.95*** 74.91*** 
 
(17.0875) (5.0785) (0.2423) (5.4207) (0.5721) (8.8461) 
N 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 
R squared 0.0818 0.6456 0.1074 0.0769 0.0261 0.0501 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
 
4.2.5. The Case of Middle East and North Africa 
The results for Middle East and North Africa as sown in table 6 below, show similar 
patterns to what has been observed for other geographical regions and all MFIs 
collectively. For model 1, which defines the relationship between the SPI and the 
explanatory variables, it was found that all coefficients are statistically insignificant 
except for the intercept and the coefficient of loans per loan officer. This coefficient for 
loans per loan officer is positive and therefore is consistent with what has been observed 
for all MFIs regardless of their geographical regions (table 1) and even when geographic 
regions are under considerations. On the other hand, for Model 2 all coefficients are 




significant except the coefficients of profit and regulatory status. In the exception of 
results found for East Africa and the Pacific, the nature of the relationship found here for 
model 2, is consistent with all other geographic regions individually and collectively. 
Model 3 reveals coefficients which are statistically significant for only the intercept, 
regulatory status and loans per loan officer. An observed negative coefficient for 
regulatory status deviates from what has been observed for all other areas signifying that 
for the Middle East and North Africa, regulated MFIs are able to present cheaper CB. 
However, the nature of the relationship between loans per loan officer and cost per 
borrower is as observed for all other areas. Model 4 shows results with all coefficients 
statistically significant in the exception of the coefficient of profit status. These results 
reflect similar relationships between the explanatory variables and the independent 
variable in all geographical areas except for a reverse relationship which was observed for 
MFI age and ABPGNI in East Asia and the Pacific. Furthermore, the relationship 
between MFI assets and ABPGNI in Latin America and the Caribbean shows an inverse 
relationship compared to what has been observed for the Middle East and North Africa. 
Models 5 and 6 both have only the coefficients of the intercept and loans per loan officer 
positive and statistically significant, which differs from what have been observed for all 
areas. 
Table 6: Table of results for MFIs in Middle East and North Africa 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
Age 0.0057 0.0035* 0.00002 0.0030*** 0.0001 -0.0034 
 
(0.0062) (0.0021) (0.00005) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0039) 
profit status 0.0598 0.1468 -0.0015 -0.1152 0.0042 -0.2197 
 
(0.4934) (0.1513) (0.0044) (0.1179) (0.0190) (0.2121) 
regulatory status -0.1868 -0.0505 -0.0032** -0.0723* -0.0076 -0.0488 
 
(0.1737) (0.0534) (0.0015) (0.0411) (0.0068) (0.0759) 
loans/loan officer 0.1861*** 0.0424*** 0.0008*** 0.0150*** 0.0071*** 0.0706*** 
 
(0 .0251) (0.0086) (0.0002) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0155) 
Lnassets -2.3883 8.2177*** -0.0238 -1.4587*** 0.0456 -2.3452 
 
(2.6826) (0.9057) (0.0225) (0.4569) (0.1388) (1.5362) 
Constant 482.18*** -84.19*** 99.99*** 119.66*** 29.25*** 120.93*** 
 
(64.6392) (20.6035) (0.5716) (13.9025) (2.8430) (31.5720) 
N 212 212 212 212 212 212 
R squared 0.3424 0.6143 0.1629 0.1408 0.1615 0.2262 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
4.2.6. The Case of South Asia 
Table 7 below shows results for MFIs in the case of South Asia. Considering MFIs in 
South Asia, it was found that MFIs that possessed more assets have the tendency of 
performing more socially which is consistent for what has been observed for most 
geographic areas. All other coefficients were however statistically insignificant. For 
model 2 and 3 only the coefficients of age, assets and the intercept are statistically 
significant. Considering these models, what have been observed to be the relationship 
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between age and the independent variables CB and outreach remain consistent with the 
observations made with all MFIs collectively regardless of geographic area (table 1) 
however, considering geographic areas, there seem to be inconsistency in observed 
relationships. 
Table 7: Table of results for MFIs in South Asia 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SP OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
Age 0.0055 0.0038** 0.0002*** 0.0047*** 0.0005*** -0.0045 
 
(0.0059) (0.0018) (0.00003) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0034) 
profit status -0.1078 -0.0125 0.0002 -0.0192 -0.0028 -0.0002 
 
(0.1374) (0.0343) (0.0005) (0.0301) (0.0031) (0.0619) 
regulatory status -0.0981 -0.0396 -0.0001 -0.0181 -0.0002 0.0730 
 
(0.1302) (0.0323) (0.0005) (0.0285) (0.0029) (0.0582) 
loans/loan officer 0.0006 0.0004 0.00001 0.0008 0.00001 -0.0013 
 
(0.0027) (0.0008) (0.00001) (0.0006) (0.00009) (0.0016) 
lnassets 10.4678*** 7.2750*** 0.0222*** 0.4594 0.2594*** -0.1022 
 
(1.4262) (0.4480) (0.0086) (0.3278) (0.0495) (0.8497) 
constant 360.32*** -30.69*** 99.35*** 79.10*** 26.53*** 72.53*** 
 
(28.4747) (8.4611) (0.1568) (6.4602) (0.9069) (15.8967) 
N 554 554 554 554 554 554 
R squared 0.1374 0.4689 0.1665 0.0372 0.1733 0.0265 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively 
The relationship between assets and MFI outreach remains constant across all geographic 
areas however the relationship between assets and CB varies depending on geographic 
area. Model 4 shows only the coefficient of age and the intercept to be positive and 
statistically significant. Model 5 however shows positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for age, assets and the intercept. This is similar to what was observed for most 
areas. Model 6 on the other hand, has no significant coefficients except for the intercept.  
4.3. Findings by Country Income Levels 
This section present result of MFIs grouped under their country's income level. Three 
income levels have been used - low income, low-middle income and upper-middle 
income levels. Results for MFIs in low income countries are shown in table 8 below. 
Considering this category of MFIs, it was found that all coefficients were statistically 
significant except the coefficient of age for Model 1. Model 2 also had all coefficients 
significant except for the coefficient of profit status. The nature of the relationship 
between all explanatory variables and the dependent variable for model 1 (SPI) and 
model 2 (outreach) is analogous to what was found for all MFIs collectively (table 1). It 
has also been observed that most MFIs are located in low income countries. For model 3, 
it was found that in low income countries, as MFIs grew older, CB decreased. 
Furthermore, MFIs with more assets had relatively lower CB which falls in line with what 
was found generally for all MFIs (table 1). 
Results for models 4 and 5 do not differ significantly from what was found for similar 
models when all MFIs were used collectively as the sample however, more coefficients in 
the case of low income countries happen to be statistically significant. For model 6, the 




coefficient of age seems consistent with what was found for all MFIs collectively 
however it was also found that non-profit making MFIs in low income countries usually 
have fewer clients defaulting. This possibly could be because less interest rate is charged 
on loans taken since the MFIs are not profit oriented. Interestingly, contrasting what has 
been observed for low income countries with low-middle income countries, no significant 
relationship differences have been observed.  
 
Table 8: Table of results for MFIs in Low Income Countries 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0010 0.0024*** -0.00004 0.0046*** 0.0001 -0.0062*** 
 
(0.0031) (0.0009) (0.00004) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0018) 
profit status -0.1564** -0.0167 0.0024*** -0.0361 -0.0037** -0.0584** 
 
(0.0793) (0.0200) (0.0008) (0.0235) (0.0017) (0.0295) 
regulatory status -0.3125*** -0.0483** -0.0007 -0.1200*** -0.0004 0.0034 
 
(0.0792) (0.0199) (0.0008) (0.0234) (0.0017) (0.0293) 
loans/loan officer 0.0098*** 0.0040*** 0.0001*** 0.0036*** 0.00009 -0.0008 
 
(0.0027) (0.0008) (0.00003) (0.0009) (0.00009) (0.0015) 
lnassets 6.6956*** 7.5814*** -0.0287** -0.1138 0.1311*** -0.4611 
 
(0.9821) (0.2905) (0.0120) (0.3246) (0.0314) (0.5290) 
constant 400.82*** -43.18*** 99.89*** 84.59*** 29.10*** 84.00*** 
 
(18.1493) (5.1640) (0.2133) (5.8358) (0.5340) (9.0501) 
N 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R squared 0.0820 0.4858 0.0590 0.0777 0.0705 0.0285 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and ***: significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
 
 
Table 9: Table of results for MFIs in Low-Middle Income Countries 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age -0.0042* 0.0012* 0.0004*** 0.0024*** -0.0002* -0.0088*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.00009) (0.0013) 
profit status 0.1753*** -0.0135 -0.0058** 0.0222 0.0023 0.1004*** 
 
(0.0564) (0.0161) (0.0028) (0.0159) (0.0018) (0.0240) 
regulatory status -0.2498*** -0.0583*** 0.0027 -0.1059*** 0.0021 0.0657*** 
 
(0.0536) (0.0153) (0.0027) (0.0151) (0.0018) (0.0228) 
loans/loan officer 0.0176*** 0.0050*** 0.0008*** 0.0056*** 0.00008 0.0051** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0021) 
lnassets 5.5769*** 7.5420***  -0.6603*** -0.1572 0.0373 0.5724 
 
(0.8046) (0.2354) (0.0455) (0.2539) (0.0294) (0.4306) 
constant 381.94*** -50.45*** 109.25*** 87.37*** 30.71*** 54.78*** 
 
(13.7110) (3.9908) (0.7567) (4.2329) (0.4909) (7.0446) 
N 2289 2289 2289 2289 2289 2289 
R squared 0.1075 0.5554 0.0355 0.1476 0.0066 0.0617 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and ***: significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
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Considering Models 1 for both low income and low-middle income countries it was 
found that only the relationship between profit status and the SPI differed. As profit 
making MFIs performed more socially in low income countries, non-profit MFIs rather 
performed more socially in low-middle income countries. Taking into account models 2 
and 4 as shown in table 9 below, no significant differences were observed for MFIs in 
both categories of countries.However, model 3 presents significant differences where the 
relationships differ in both country groups when considering the relationships between 
age and profit status and the independent variable, CB. Models 5 and 6 also show very 
significant difference in relationships between the explanatory variables and their 
respective regressands. Examples are the difference in the relationship between profit 
status and the regressand of model 6 (PAR90) as well as the relationship between age and 
the regressand of model 5 (OSS). 
 
Table 10: Table of results for MFIs in Upper-Middle Income Countries 
Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
SPI OUTREACH CB ABPGNI OSS PAR90 
age 0.0026 0.0023 -0.0002*** 0.0014 0.0001 -0.0032 
 
(0.0056) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0038) 
profit status -0.4848*** -0.0499 -0.0004 -0.1009*** 0.0004 -0.2086*** 
 
(0.1331) (0.0366) (0.0032) (0.0305) (0.0042) (0.0581) 
regulatory status 0.0182 0.0013 0.0017 -0.0272 -0.0064 0.0291 
 
(0.1535) (0.0416) (0.0037) (0.0357) (0.0047) (0.0648) 
loans/loan officer 0.0264** 0.0069* 0.0011*** 0.0049** 0.0010* 0.0117 
 
(0.0120) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0078) 
lnassets 0.5458 7.3272***  -0.0828 -0.7208* 0.3263*** -2.6766** 
 
(2.2596) (0.7217) (0.0533) (0.4047) (0.0896) (1.2853) 
constant 488.49*** -50.88*** 99.95*** 107.67*** 25.80*** 120.66*** 
 
(36.2362) (11.4117) (0.8575) (6.6893) (1.4078) (20.1238) 
N 282 282 282 282 282 282 
R squared 0.1867 0.5475 0.1274 0.1517 0.1710 0.1526 
Notes: standard errors are in brackets. *,** and ***: significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels  
MFIs that fall under the category of upper-middle income countries seem to show traits 
consistent with what has been observed for MFIs in low income countries when 
considering model 1 as shown in table 10 above. In the terms of the scope of MFI 
outreach which is explained by model 2 across all tables, it is evident that all statistically 
significant coefficient seem to reflect similar relationships when considering all three 
income levels under study. Most of the relationships found to exist between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables for all models in the case of upper-
middle income seem to be quite consistent with what has been observed for low income 
countries rather than low-middle income countries.   
5. Conclusion 
The paper investigated possible indicators which may contribute to MFI social 
performance. In doing this, MFI social performance rating were generated using 8 
different indicators namely; MFI outreach, average outstanding balance/GNI per capita, 
cost per borrower, number of offices, operational self-sufficiency, percent of women 
borrowers, portfolio at risk after 90 days and write-off ratio. These ratings were achieved 




by quantifying all qualitative values of relevant indicators presented by the MixMarket 
and then rescaling the values of all other indicators to follow a normal distribution after 
which the sum of the all rescaled indicators are taken to form the SPI. In addition, by 
employing the technique of panel data analysis, this paper investigated a number of 
explanatory variables and how they could possibly affect social performance. These 
variables are MFI age, assets, regulation status, loans per loan officers and MFI profit 
status. This study took into account the geographic locations of MFIs and the income 
levels of the countries in which they operate. It was found that the effects of these 
variables on social performance in each geographic region were mostly similar to each 
other except for Eastern Europe and Central Asia that differed slightly. Furthermore, 
MFIs in low-income countries, behaved similarly to MFIs in upper-middle income 
countries with MFIs in low-middle income countries showing unique trends from the 
other sets of MFIs. Overall, the paper provides evidence that older MFIs as well as 
regulated ones tend to perform less socially as compared to younger and non-regulated 
MFIs. In addition, the results also point to the fact that MFIs with more assets and higher 
ratios for loans per loan officer have the tendency of performing more socially.  
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